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:

WILLIAM D. TYREE,

:
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Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The plain language of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) requires that sentence actually be
imposed within the statutory maximum of 45 days from the plea unless the defendant
agrees otherwise. Moreover, even if the statute were ambiguous, the purpose of the
statute, policy considerations and the amendment extending the period to allow
preparation of presentence reports demonstrate that Rule 22(a) requires actual imposition
of sentence within the statutory period unless the defendant agrees to be sentenced
outside that period.
Tyree did not agree to be sentenced outside the statutory maximum in this case.
The language of the rule requires an affirmative concurrence in order to be sentenced
beyond the statutory maximum. Requesting a presentence report at the plea hearing and
remaining silent when the judge continues sentencing on his own motion does not amount
to an affirmative concurrence.

Tyree argued prejudice below, thereby preserving his prejudice argument for
appeal. The record also supports the prejudice argument since defense counsel proffered
the adverse effects caused by a delay in sentencing. Moreover, because the present case
could not be reviewed by the Board of Pardons until Tyree was sentenced, the delay in
sentencing in this case created an apparent adverse effect without requiring resort to
further record support.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION TO SENTENCE
APPELLANT WHEN IT CONTINUED THE TIME FOR IMPOSING
SENTENCE BEYOND THE 45 DAY LIMIT WITHOUT TYREE'S
CONCURRENCE.
A. RULE 22(a) REQUIRES THAT SENTENCING OCCUR WITHIN 45
DAYS OF THE PLEA UNLESS THE DEFENDANT AGREES
OTHERWISE.
The state argues that the plain language of Rule 22(a) requires only that the trial
court initially schedule a time for imposing sentence which is within 45 days of the plea.
State's brief ("S.B.") at 5-6. According to the state, once the trial judge has initially
scheduled sentencing within 45 days, the requirements of the plain language of the rule
are met, and any continuances outside the 45-day time period do not violate the rule. S.B.
at 5.
Contrary to the state's claim, Rule 22(a) requires that sentencing be imposed
within 45 days of the plea unless the defendant agrees otherwise. The plain language of
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the rule mandates that the trial judge "set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be
less than two nor more than 45 days after verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders." This language requires not just that a
time for sentencing be set within the period, but that the sentence be imposed within the
applicable period. If the rule required only that the initial date for sentencing be within
the 45 days, the term "imposing sentence" would be unnecessary. See State v.
Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("When examining a statute's plain
language, we strive . . . to give effect to all of the statute's terms."). Instead, the rule
would state that the trial judge was required to schedule an initial sentencing time within
that period.
While the plain language of the rule appears to require sentencing within 45 days
of the plea unless the defendant agrees otherwise, even if the language were ambiguous
and could be interpreted as the state suggests, such an interpretation fails when the rule is
read as a whole and its purpose is considered. See generally Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT
App 139, %9, 980 P.2d 214 (courts resort to methods of interpretation other than reliance
on plain language when the language of the statute is ambiguous); State v. Garcia, 965
P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (in interpreting a statute, courts look first to plain
language; where plain language is ambiguous, courts may consider legislative history and
relevant policy considerations).
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Even a cursory reading of Rule 22(a) shows that the purpose of the rule is to
ensure that unreasonable delays in imposing sentence do not occur. No purpose would be
served by requiring only that an initial sentencing date be set within the 45 days. Trial
judges could actually sentence defendants whenever they pleased if the state were correct
in its interpretation of the rule. Under such an interpretation, the rule would have no
impact in precluding unreasonable delays in sentencing. Moreover, the state's
interpretation would result in an inefficient administration of justice since defendants
would be required to appear for sentencing within the 45 days., then appear later when the
judge actually intended to impose sentence. The rule makes no sense unless it is read to
require sentence be imposed within 45 days of the plea unless the defendant agrees
otherwise.
Case law interpreting the predecessor statute tells us that one of the purposes is to
ensure that unreasonable delay in sentencing not occur. See State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794,
797 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the rule was revised to extend the maximum time for
sentencing to 45 days to allow time for preparation of presentence reports and to
otherwise ensure that the rule continued to be effective in ensuring that persons are
sentenced within a reasonable amount of time. Amending the rule to extend the time to
allow for preparation of presentence reports would be unnecessary if the state were
correct that the rule simply requires an initial setting, and not actual imposition of
sentencing, within the applicable period. If the state were correct, the extension of the
4

maximum period to 45 days would have been unnecessary since any sentencing requiring
a presentence report could simply be continued without the concurrence of the defendant.
The state is incorrect when it claims that the rule does not require actual sentencing
within the maximum period, and instead requires only that an initial date for sentencing
be set within that period. The language of the rule, its purpose, policy considerations,
and the amendment of the maximum time period all demonstrate that the rule requires
actual sentencing within the applicable period, unless the defendant agrees otherwise.
B. TYREE DID NOT AGREE TO EXTEND THE MAXIMUM TIME
FOR SENTENCING.
The state argues that Tyree agreed to the continuances of sentencing by not
objecting when the trial judge continued sentencing in order to obtain a presentence
report, and that the requirements of Rule 22(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a)
(1999) were therefore met. S.B. at 5-6. While the state is correct that in some
circumstances, a defendant's silence can constitute a waiver, that is not the case with
Rule 22(a). The language of Rule 22(a), which explicitly requires the concurrence of the
defendant, implies that an affirmative act by the defendant is necessary in order to
continue sentencing. In this case, Tyree did not affirmatively agree to the trial judge's
decision to sentence him outside the maximum period.
The fact that Tyree requested a presentence report when he entered his plea does
not demonstrate that he agreed to the sentencing continuances which occurred later. At
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the time Tyree requested the presentence report, the expectation was that Tyree would be
sentenced within the statutory period. In fact, at the time he requested the presentence
report, sentencing was scheduled during the applicable period. Because Tyree did not
know that his request for a presentence report would result in a sentencing hearing far
outside the statutory period, his request for a presentence report cannot reasonably be read
as an agreement to be sentenced beyond the statutory maximum. The facts that Tyree
requested a presentence report when he pled guilty and did not object to the continuance
of the sentencing do not amount to an affirmative concurrence to be sentenced outside the
maximum period.
C. RULE 22(a) CREATES A JURISDICTIONAL BAR.
Tyree's argument that Rule 22(a) creates a jurisdictional bar is adequately set forth
in Appellant's opening brief at 6-11. Reply is unnecessary as to this aspect of Appellant's
argument.
D. THE CLAIM OF PREJUDICE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT.
Although Tyree argues that Rule 22(a) creates a jurisdictional bar, he also argues
that even if a jurisdictional bar did not exist, he was prejudiced by the delay in sentencing.
Contrary to the state's claim that Appellant's prejudice argument was not made below
(S.B. at 14-15), that argument is found at R. 65:16-17.
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The prosecutor argued that Tyree could not "articulate that he's been prejudiced."
R. 65:15. Defense counsel responded that Tyree had in fact been prejudiced by the delay
in sentencing.
Defense counsel: —I agree with the State, that Helms does anticipate a
balancing test, a prong of which is prejudice to the Defendant. So we
dispute that that is part of what this Court ought to engage with Rule 22(a).
But just for the sake of argument, if the Court is looking for an adverse
affect to the Defendant, the presence of an open case prohibits him from
receiving privileges at the prison. It prohibits him from going before the
Board. It— and so it does work an adverse affect.
R. 65:16.
This passage establishes that the state is incorrect when it claims that Tyree did not
raise the prejudice argument below. Additionally, it shows that defense counsel proffered
the adverse effects to Tyree when a case he was not sentenced in a timely fashion. Thus,
the state's claim that the prejudice argument has no record support is also incorrect.
Moreover, it is obvious that an inmate will not go before the Board on at least the case in
which sentencing is delayed until after sentence is actually imposed. The very fact that
Tyree had not been sentenced establishes, without need to resort to other support, that
Tyree was not able to appear before the Board in this case until sentencing actually
occurred.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant William Tyree respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
sentence.
SUBMITTED this J2^L day of September, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street,
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P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this a ? ^ day of September, 2000.
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